Wednesday, March 20, 2013

The Emporer's COG Analysis..



We know they were evil… but the Empire didn't almost conquer the universe without doing a few things right.   Like it or not, the Emperor was a big picture strategic thinker who got it right most of the time (for what he wanted to do)..   He didn't whimsically attack his enemies..  He conducted careful planning that included some kind of decision making process.  Inside this process there were likely Center of Gravity (COG) analysis' which assisted him in determining where to focus his efforts.  His COG analysis would have shaped his grand strategy as it revealed the key weaknesses of his enemies.   

Clausewitz identified the COG as, "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends... and the point at which all our energies should be directed".  In the Emperor's case the Jedi may have not been the initial choice.  To the untrained eye, perhaps the Senate or Trade Federation would have seemed like better candidates.  In my attempt to understand the thinking I have build a COG analysis to walk you through what his staff may have done to ensure they got it right.  After all, the COG analysis is so important that if the staff gets it wrong and the leader doesn't catch it - he/she almost always loses.

So lets take a quick look...  The Emperor's staff likely undertook the following steps:

1.  Executed some kind of brainstorming session with a highly qualified group with diverse experience and opinions.  Darth Vader would not have been welcome in this group because of his dogmatic tendencies.. ie.. choke his critics.  The discussion would have been robust and the session would have produced a tight list of about 4 possible COGs.

2.  The group leader would have then embarked on a great effort to screen out the faux COGs.  This would have been tricky as the proposals could have had "defenders" who were emotionally attached and ready to defend theirs to the end.  The group leader would have also fought tenaciously against "Group think".. Group think occurs when too many like minded people rally around their leader and try to force their idea as truth. often the idea is flawed and, if accepted, negatively impacts the mission..  The Emperor was obviously too clever to allow this so he probably put together an A-List team that looked and behaved more like the Jedi Council. 

So, they would have had to rule out the Senate, Trade Federation, and perhaps a few more.  The Senate could have been eliminated because it was indecisive - it had no real ability to push back and therefore wasn't "the hub of all power".  The Trade Federation at one point it may have been a COG because it was attacked (manipulated) by the Order of the Sith Lords.  His staff correctly identified The Jedi because they best met the criteria.. They were the hub of all power (guardians of the republic) and certainly had the ability to threaten the Emperor directly. 

3.  Their analysis of the Jedi COG was probably a little different than mine however it rendered what would be some solid Objectives. 

Critical Capabilities: (These are the crucial enablers that allow the power base to function) Expressed as verbs: Sense, Attack, Influence, Command, Control.

Critical Requirements: (These are components or resources that enable the capabilities to be functional) They are typically nouns but also conditions: Training Center, Legitimacy, Networks, Light Sabers, Command and Control Center.

Critical Vulnerabilities: (These are critical vulnerabilities of the components of the critical requirements that are vulnerable to direct or indirect attack) These are also nouns: Jedi Council Members-Mentors/Trainers, power grid, Light Saber Production and Supply.

Undoubtedly the Crucial Vulnerabilities would have became some of his Strategic Objectives.  Because of the unique powers of the Jedi, all would need to be destroyed but priority would be given to the council's senior members such as Obi-Wan Kenobi, Master Whindu, Yoda, and the others who were not only senior adviser's but trainers and mentors.  The Emperor would need to attack the Jedi Temple either directly or indirectly..  In the case of the movie he chose to attack it both indirectly (seducing Anikin) and directly (Darth Vader and his Clone Army), but if he was interested in rendering it temporarily useless he could have achieved the same effect by targeting its power grid.  According to my COG analysis below he could have also pursued a simultaneous attack on Light Saber production and supply.  This would have been interesting because the Jedi are tied to their unique weapon - no Light Sabers = no Jedi..  


We know the Emperor failed... but was his strategic analysis wrong or did he fail in execution?  Did he fail because not everyone was on board with his plan - loose cannon "Vader"?  Or did he just bite off more than he could chew... I mean.. key figures such as Yoda and Obi Wan Kenobi escaped and eventually defeated him.  Would it have been possible to further break down the Critical Vulnerabilities from Jedi Council Members to Yoda and Obi Wan Kanobi?  In this case, all the Emperor would have had to do was eliminate them and the galaxy would be his.. uncontested.  Correctly identifying a COG is a difficult task and then analyzing it for its vulnerabilities is even more difficult.  But if the staff gets it right and builds their plan around collapsing it, chances of success are greatly improved.


Tuesday, March 12, 2013

Command philosophy




We live on the lead edge of an era of fast moving globalized change, both technological and political.  As Americans and Army Soldiers we are directly effected by this.  The technological revolution enables both us and our adversaries while the political revolutions shape our operating environments.  The road ahead offers both opportunity and risk, as threats mask themselves in change.  Because the threats are real and potent, we must be ready to execute our mission in a full spectrum environment.  To achieve this we must develop a Full Spectrum mindset.  What does this mean?  Leaders must be ready to execute the core mission while simultaneously protecting the force, and positively engaging the local human landscape.  To achieve this dynamic challenge we will empower leaders at every level of organization and focus on the basics.  To do this successfully we need engaged leaders who exercise common sense

Execute the Mission
We will focus on our core mission - on the basics.  I will utilize standard Army systems to do this.  The key to successful operations is understanding the commanders intent.  The commander's intent is not static, it will change as we move forward.  I will express my commander's intent in terms of:

Purpose - not just the "why" in the mission statement
Key Tasks - if not accomplished bring mission failure
End State - define the end game. 

We will use the push pull method to ensure all leaders successfully negotiate this dynamic road.  Above all, the commander's intent provides the left and right limits to which subordinate leaders can make autonomous decisions.  This space belongs to my subordinate leaders.  It is where he/she plans the "how" of the mission statement.  There is no room for micro-managing here.  We will utilize the full range of army tools to include a few new technological instruments to ensure we are moving down the right path.  For example:
  • Quarterly Training Guidance - what I owe you quarterly that tells you where to focus
  • Quarterly Training Brief - Commanders quantify and qualify training
  • Weekly Battalion Maintenance Meeting - How I track our equipment readiness
  • Streamer/Awards Program - To recognize excellence (Engagements, Crews... etc)
  • Family Readiness Program - Keep our families informed, empowered, and ready
  • Morale and Welfare Program - Work hard/Play Hard
  • Technological tools of the modern era - My Leader Blog/Twitter/Facebook for Families


I am a proponent of the 8-Step Training Model.  Use this for each event and you won't go wrong!
The Basics:
  • Battalion, company, and platoon training will be planned using the 8 step training model
  • Battalion, company, and platoon operations will be executed using the Warning Order (WARNO), 5 w's - What you know the truth to be at the that particular time 
  • 5 paragraph Operations Order (OPORD) (60 - 70% solution gets you out the door)
    • Briefed to the widest possible audience, followed by a Commander's Backbrief, followed by a rehearsal. Rehearsals are key to success. If a leader fails in every other area, he/she can still carry the day by rehearsing the critical points of a mission.
  • Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)  Adjust your order as you go - send changes to subordinates
  • Section size elements and below will utilize the Paralell Planning Process 
Protect the Force

We fight tonight
We must be the best we must be fully trained in our core competencies, physically, and mentally ready to dominate any environment.  This is what will ultimately bring us all home safely.  The we fight tonight mentality means just that.. we will be ready!  This mentality must become the cultural touchstone of our organization.  Our Soldiers, Army, and country deserve no less.
  • 100% qualification on basic marksmanship
  • 100% qualification on reflexive fire
  • 100% stabilization of crew served weapons - that is the crews qualify together and are not whimsically broken up
  • Cyber Security
Positively engaging the local human landscape

We are stakeholders wherever we are, especially when we are deployed.  When we are in garrison I expect a robust community outreach program.  When we are deployed I expect a robust partnership and an outreach program.  A robust partnership means we are actively mentoring the forces of our host nation.  An outreach program means we are engaging the civilian population, where we can, to promote a positive image of ourselves and our country.  We will actively utilize our intel assets to identify the hazards in this environment.  We will mitigate risk as much as possible.

The future of our country and army is bright, but that doesn't mean we can let our guard down.  We must understand that globalization quickly changes how we do business (the strategic Corporal).  We must be able to quickly and safely integrate new technologies.. this is a key advantage.  We must  understand the environment in which we traditionally operate.  This environment is currently dominated by three factors, the "Arab Spring", the "Nuclear Ambitions" of Iran, and the "ethno-religious political tension" that exists between them and other neighboring countries and regional powers.  This includes the situations taking shape in the countries bordering Isreal.  This is a complex environment that requires maximum situational awareness.  To flourish in this environment we must live the Army Values, be flexible, highly trained, and well organized.  We must have robust systems manned by certified and stabilized crews which have been certified, evaluated collectively, and validated by commanders.
I see organizations as series inter-related systems and sub-systems in constant interaction.  Under normal operational conditions these interact effectively and efficiently.  I will place these systems under stress continuously to ensure they are sound and flexible.  To achieve success leaders will use my commander's intent and their initiative to either develop or modify existing systems to support my vision.  If systems are in conflict then involved leaders fix them quickly.  Disfunctionality makes us vulnerable.  While we live an amazing technological age, we must remember that requires each of us to be better at almost everything.. to be the Pentathlete.

Our flag is to be respected Always and forever

Thursday, February 28, 2013

"Operation Too Late"

In early January I was ordered to pull in my patrols and prepare to conduct a mission that would require all of my forces.  The mission was to guard a large Ammunition Dump to the northwest of the Forward Operating Base or FOB. I was given no amplifying information so I conducted a reconnaissance.. This revealed the ammunition dump was empty, not surprisingly, the enemy had cleaned it out!! When I returned, I showed the operations officer and battalion commander my reconnaissance pictures and recommended we don't waste our precious resources guarding an empty facility.

Me in early January 04 on a reconnaissance of the ammunition Dump. Visible in the background are the piles of packaging discarded by the enemy as they freely collected ordinance. I was unaware  that it was not guarded. It was initially not in my area of operations.

I was shocked when I was ordered to do the mission anyway. I strongly advised against this pointing out the folly of dedicating precious assets to guard an empty facility with an active enemy presence in our area.  In Army speak, I was ordered to "Shut up and color".

We arrived on January 4th and linked into a perimeter established by a sister unit. We executed a 24/7 guard of part of the facility that would continue for almost two weeks. It was uneventful since there was nothing left of value! We completed what became known to us as, "Operation Too Late" on January 16th. We resumed our patrols on January 17.

On that cool January morning the First Sergeant and I passed our morning patrol on the road as we headed to Tikrit to attend a staff meeting. When we arrived we were told to go to the "commanders hooch" - where the commander and command sergeant major lived. We were confused. The battalion commander pulled me aside and informed me that one of my Bradleys had just been destroyed by a massive IED and there were casualties. I looked at First Sergeant and said, "we need to get down there now". We sped back to Al Taji.

We could see the black smoke and helicopters circling over the site. The traffic was backed up for several miles.

The blast site was enormous. Big enough to hide a medium size pickup truck. I would find out from the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team that the bomb was comprised of at least 2, 155mm South African artillery rounds and 200lbs of PE 4 (Warsaw Pact military grade explosives). It was dug into a culvert around a water pipe connecting two irrigation ditches. The EOD assessed that a bomb of this size took at least a week to build. The IED was hard wired across a field (300 meters) and up to the side of an abandoned farm house. The enemy had used a succession of trash bags tied to the tops of overgrown weeds as aiming posts.
The blast was so large that it shot the turret of the Bradley into an adjacent field and flipped the hull upside down 30ft from the blast site. The combustible metals were ignited and the hull burned down to nothing. The vapor was toxic and much heroism was demonstrated that day but especially by the crew of the trail Bradley as a soldier crawled past the exploding ammunition to rescue the gunner and commander who were in the turret during the explosion. One of the soldiers M16 rifles was later found blasted into hull so deep it couldn't be recovered. Three American soldiers were killed, two were seriously wounded, and two of our Iraqi allies were also killed.

SGT Edmond Randle, SPC Larry Polly Jr, and PFC Cody Orr (the Team Bulldog soldier) of Kerrville, Texas were killed. They are missed and not forgotten.
To our disgust, after the attack there was no operational change. Our leadership continued to send us on the same worthless missions as if nothing happened. It is an understatement to say that we were outraged. I demanded change and after a tense showdown, I was authorized to move in a different direction as long as I did the planning. The Bulldog leadership collectively built a viable plan that stopped the attacks for the remainder of the time we were in Al Taji. I will discuss the methodoloy in a future post. But I remain angry over the incompetence and lack of care demonstrated by elements of our leadership.
Military leaders are taught to lead under stress and follow orders.. but what do you do when the trust that glues this all together breaks down?  We are not taught how to handle situations in which the problem is our leadership - this needs to be discussed!
At some level I feel responsible for the death of the men who died on January 17, 2004. I wish I would have fought harder at higher levels to keep this mission from happening. I knew it was a bad move to place 100% of our assets in one location. It pains me that those men lost their lives. I think of them all the time, wondering what they would have done with the rest of their lives, what their childern would have become? I ended up staving off other senseless missions and brought night operations online that successfully targeted IED emplacement. In the almost three months that remained of our deployment we didn't have another Bradley attacked or have another Soldier killed. I attribute this success to the innovative nature and bravery of our men. God Bless the USA, and the citizenry who trust our Officer Corps with their most precious blessings - their children.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Iraq - The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly!!


The Good:  I believe military leadership is based on a trust between leaders and subordinates. Subordinates rely on competent engaged leaders to do their best in building military missions. There exists a kind of implied trust between them. The leader trusts that the subordinate will do the assigned task to the best of his/her ability and the subordinate trusts that the leader has done his homework in creating a plan that will get the job done while managing risk. The good news is, it works! The vast majority of the soldiers under my command were fantastic.  They were mission focused professionals who were engaged 24/7.  They were flexible and did their best to accomplish the mission and take care of each other.  I am proud to have been their commander.  I worked hard to earn and keep their trust.  I felt they had my back and I had theirs.  I still keep in contact with most today and would do anything I can to help them.
 
The Bad: As a new commander I found myself in a hostile environment with higher command as well as the enemy.  I felt comfortable leading my men against the enemy.  But the fight against higher command was daunting and cost us big.  It was an uphill fight that I didn't want.  I was outnumbered and out ranked by a group that didn't have our best interests at heart - we were their cannon fodder!  My unit was known as "Team Bulldog".  At the high water mark, we had about 155 personnel.  We enjoyed a overwhelming advantage in capabilities since the beginning of the war in March 2003.  However in the fall of 2003 the enemy began to counter aggressively.  The weapon of choice was initially the AK-47, then the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), then the Improvised Explosive Device (IED).  Thereafter, the tactics morphed but the IED was always the centerpiece.

The Ugly: As an incoming commander in the fall of 2003, I arrived on the heels of the death of our battalion Command Sergeant Major - James Blankenbecler.  He was an inspirational leader that was ambushed with 6 Rocket Propelled Grenades as he slowed down around Samarra driving towards Al Taji.  He is missed by his family and military brothers.. he is not forgotten.

As I prepared to assume command the enemy shifted aggressively towards IED attacks.  The rapid proliferation of these attacks caught everyone off guard.  In the two months that I was preparing to assume command everyone witnessed an explosion in the numbers of IED attacks.  This tactic became active in Bulldog area quickly destroying two of our Bradley Linebackers.  Among the casualties was SPC Genaro Acosta, a well liked young soldier whose death shocked and saddened the men.

The second IED rendered a Bradley useless and caused some injuries but thankfully no one was killed.

   
The enemy get a vote...  They were successful in changing the game.  It made all of our jobs more difficult.  That didn't change our approach.  We reacted to this ugly development.  How we did so is another post.
 
I never met SPC Acosta, he as killed before I assumed command but he has become a small part of my life as I wonder how much better our country would be if he would have survived.  I guess I am kind of moved by that fact that this good man is not here.  This is what screams out to me.
 
I only briefly met CSM Blankenbecler, but as they say first impressions are everything and he made a great one on me.  I volunteered to be the escort officer (escort his coffin back to the USA) but one of his brothers in arms stepped up.  I still get teary eyed when I remember his daughter reading the last letter she would write to him at the funeral.
 
God Bless the USA and our fighting men and women!